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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Davis appeals, challenging the restitution order entered in his case.

The

restitution award was for damages done to a dirt bike which Mr. Davis bought under
circumstances under which he should have reasonably believed to the dirt bike to have
been stolen.

The error in the award was for damages to the dirt bike for which

Mr. Davis was not the proximate cause, or, alternatively, for which there was an
intervening cause. The State responds, simply asserting that the damages to the dirt
bike, caused by a third party, were reasonably foreseeable without explaining why that
is so. The damages, caused by a third party, were not, given all the information in the
record, reasonably foreseeable. Given the Court of Appeals' recent decisions further
explaining causation as it relates to restitution, the district court's restitution order
erroneously ordered Mr. Davis to pay restitution for damages which he had not been
proven to have caused.
Therefore, this Court should vacate the restitution award for costs which the
State failed to prove were caused by Mr. Davis's criminal conduct. Alternatively, if the
record is not sufficiently clear to determine the amount of the damages caused by
Mr. Davis, this Court should remand the case for a limited hearing to determine the
value of the parts Mr. Davis admitted to damaging and the cost to replace only those
parts.

1

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Davis's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUE
Whether the district court erred by awarding restitution for damages when Mr. Davis
was not the cause of those damages?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Awarding Restitution For Damages When Mr. Davis Was
Not The Cause Of Those Damages
Over the last few months, the Idaho Court of Appeals has issued several
decisions which further explain the application of causation analysis in the restitution
context. See State v. Eddins,_ P.3d _ , 2014 WL 503492 (Ct. App. Feb. 10, 2014)
(not yet final); State v. Hurles,_ P.3d _ , 2014 WL 185977 (Ct. App. Jan. 17, 2014),

pet. rev. pending; State v. Houser, 155 Idaho 521 (Ct. App. 2013).

The rules and

analysis in these decisions are applicable to this case and demonstrate that, because
Mr. Kearl's behavior broke the causal connection between Mr. Davis's criminal conduct
and some of the losses suffered by the dirt bike's owner, the restitution order for those
losses is inappropriate.
In Houser, the Court of Appeals addressed the burden of proof that the State
must meet in order to justify a restitution award. Houser, 155 Idaho 521. Because the
State had failed to provide substantial evidence demonstrating that the loss claimed
(wages for missed work so the victim could attend various court hearings) was caused
by the defendant's criminal conduct, as opposed to the victim's voluntary choice to not
return to work once those hearings ended. Id. at 528.
Similarly, in this case, the State has failed to provide substantial evidence that
the damages to the dirt bike were attributable to Mr. Davis's criminal conduct.

The

evidence demonstrates that Mr. Kearl, who had purchased the dirt bike from Mr. Davis,
was riding the dirt bike when officers contacted him. (See Tr., Vol.2, p.14, Ls.17-23.)
The record also demonstrates that Mr. Davis had the bike for two days, while Mr. Kearl
had the bike over the ensuing weekend.

( See App. Br., p.13 n.11.)
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The State's

witnesses also testified that the damage to the frame of the dirt bike was the result of
crashing the dirt bike. (Tr., Vol.1, p.39, Ls.11-13; Tr., Vol.1, p.51, Ls.1-3.) The only
evidence about the condition of the dirt bike when it was sold to Mr. Kearl was
Mr. Davis's testimony. (See generally Tr.) Mr. Davis admitted to modifying parts of the
dirt bike, but otherwise, had left it in the same condition in which it had been when
another person took it from the owner. (Tr., Vol.2, p.8, L.3 - p.9, L.11; R., pp.7, 12.)
The evidence also demonstrates that the dirt bike was in good condition when it was
taken from the owner.

(Tr., Vol.1, p.45, Ls.16-21.)

Therefore, the evidence

demonstrates that it was Mr. Kearl, not Mr. Davis, who caused the damage to the frame
of the dirt bike.
As such, the remaining question is whether Mr.

Kearl's behavior was

foreseeable, or whether it constituted an intervening, superseding cause. Just because
a loss was suffered does not mean it was foreseeable. See Hurles, -

P.3d -

, 2014

WL 185977 at 11 (discussing the decisions in State v. Waidelich, 140 Idaho 622, 624
(Ct. App. 2004), and State v. Parker, 143 Idaho 165, 168 (Ct. App. 2006), pointing out
that the loss in each was caused by an independent action by the respective victim
which was not necessary to address the damages caused by the defendant's criminal
conduct, and thus, was not recoverable as restitution).

Here, the State's entire

argument about the application of the proximate cause rules to this case is as follows:
The law dictates that crime victims are entitled to restitution for economic
losses that are actually and proximately caused by the defendant's
criminal conduct. I.C. § 19-5304; Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602, 249 P.3d at
401. Because it was a reasonably foreseeable result that the stolen bike
Davis disposed of would end up damaged, proximate cause has been
established.
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(Resp. Br., p.7.) That conclusory statement does not address the fact that the Idaho
Supreme Court was clear in Lampien, that "[i]n most contexts, a crime or intentional tort
constitutes an 'independent intervening cause' that precludes a defendant's antecedent
crime from being a proximate cause." State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 367, 374 (2007).
Given that Mr. Kearl was getting the same dirt bike under similar circumstances as
Mr. Davis had, Mr. Kearl should have been aware that the dirt bike was stolen. That
means Mr. Kearl committed a crime, which constitutes an independent intervening
cause, and therefore, made Mr. Davis's antecedent crime not the proximate cause of
the damages. Id. Therefore, the restitution award for damages Mr. Kearl caused to the
dirt bike were inappropriate.
The State's conclusory argument is based on the State's discussion of the
opinions in State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599 (2011 ), and State v. Cottrell, 152 Idaho 387
(Ct. App. 2012). The Court of Appeals relied on those two opinions in Eddins to clarify
what constitutes a proximate cause: that the act in question was a reasonable reaction
to the defendant's criminal conduct, and therefore, the resulting injury was foreseeable.
See Eddins,_ P.3d _ , 2014 WL 503492 at 6-7. Thus, in Corbus, it was reasonable

for the passenger in the car the defendant was using to elude police to jump from the
car because he had no other alternative courses of action available to him. Id. at 6
(discussing Corbus, 150 Idaho at 606). As such, the injuries received when the victim
hit the ground at speed were foreseeable. Id. Similarly, in Cottrell, it was reasonable
for the officer to try to restrain the defendant as he was resisting arrest.

Id. at 7

(discussing Cottrell, 152 Idaho at 390). As such, the officer's injury received in the
ensuing tussle were foreseeable.

Id.

Therefore, in Eddins, because the victim's
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reaction to the defendant's verbal threat, which caused acid to subsequently injury his
eye, the majority concluded that the injuries were foreseeable. Id.
Applying that perspective to this case, however, a different conclusion is evident.
There was no immediate threat requiring Mr. Kearl to wantonly ride the dirt bike so that
it would be wrecked. Compare id.; Corbus, 150 Idaho at 606. Nor was he reacting to
an attempt to restrain him in some way. Compare Cottrell, 152 Idaho at 390. Rather,
Mr. Kearl was acting entirely under his own impulse, whereas the victims in Eddins,
Cottrell, and Corbus were all reacting to the defendant.

Therefore, those cases are

distinguishable from the situation here, where Mr. Kearl was acting in an entirely
independent manner. And, as discussed at length in the Appellant's Brief, Mr. Kearl's
reckless and wanton behavior was not reasonably foreseeable to Mr. Davis. Therefore,
restitution for the damages caused by Mr. Kearl was inappropriate.
Furthermore, if there is some question about whether or not Mr. Kearl's actions
were foreseeable, or whether there are issues of contributable negligence that would
offset a judgment against Mr. Davis, restitution may not be the best forum in which to
resolve the issue. Eddins, _

P.3d __ , 2014 WL 503492 at 8-10 (Gutierrez, C.J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part). In Eddins, the Chief Judge reminded the
majority that "the purpose of the statutory restitution process is to award those
economic losses caused by the already adjudicated criminal act; the purpose is not to
search for or speculate as to what act caused the damage." Id. at 10 (emphasis from
original). Thus, where there are open questions in that regard, the matter would be
more appropriately resolved in the civil arena. Id. After all, "[t]he restitution statute was
never meant to be a substitute for a civil action where the law is settled as to damages
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and the quantum of admissible proof needed to prove those damages." State v. Straub,
153 Idaho 882, 890 (2013).
Applying those rules to this case, the record is clear that Mr. Davis caused only
some of the damage to the dirt bike, but not all (particularly the damage to the frame).
Therefore, this Court should vacate those portions of the restitution order which are for
those damages not caused by Mr. Davis. 1

If this Court determines that additional

hearings are necessary to clarify the value of those damages which Mr. Davis has been
proved to have caused, then it should remand this case to the district court for that
limited purpose.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Davis respectfully requests that this Court vacate the restitution order except
for the award of $397.11 for damages which he concedes he caused. Alternatively, he
requests that this Court remand the case for the limited purpose of calculating the
restitution for only the damages he admitted causing.
DATED this 18th day of February, 2014.

di4~·

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

The Appellant's Brief breaks down the evidence in the record in this regard. It
sufficiently proves that Mr. Davis was responsible for $397.11 of the damages.
(App. Br., pp.20-21.)
1
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